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T he HALO Trust (HALO) has been working in Ukraine since 2015, a year after the hostilities in the east of the country began. Both the ongoing conflict in the Donbas and ten-sions on the border with Russia have left large areas of land 
contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). In places where the frontline has moved on and the fighting 
has stopped, mines and other ERW remain, preventing the lives of ci-
vilians from returning to normal.  
HALO currently has around 400 full-time staff employed in 
Ukraine and is conducting manual and mechanical clearance, non-
technical and technical survey, risk education, and some capacity 
building with state authorities to enhance their capabilities to car-
ry out humanitarian survey and data gathering. HALO’s program in 
Ukraine is currently funded by the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland, and has 
received funding in the past from Switzerland, the Czech Republic, 
and the European Union.
As in every part of the world, Ukraine has its own set of chal-
lenges that affect humanitarian mine clearance. The key challenges 
facing humanitarian mine clearance in Ukraine relate to the main 
threat types encountered: tripwire-initiated devices and both metal- 
and minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines. There are additional chal-
lenges relating to the specifics of the Ukrainian context: demining in 
an active conflict zone, working without explosives, and the extreme 
weather conditions. New techniques and technology, some tried and 
tested in other countries, are being explored. These are too numer-
ous to list; however, we will discuss a few of the key ways HALO is 
overcoming some of the challenges of conducting humanitarian mine 
clearance in Ukraine.
 Context
The two regions of Donetsk and Luhansk are currently in a de facto 
state of division between the territory controlled by the government 
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Image 2: A RDG-5 hand grenade with a nylon tripwire.
Image 1. Items found on HALO tasks. A TM-62 anti-vehicle 
mine with fuze visible on the surface and side exposed 
through excavation.
All images courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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of Ukraine and separatist non-government controlled areas (NGCA). 
The terms of the Minsk ceasefire agreement created a 15 km (9.3 mi) 
buffer zone on either side of the line of contact between the two op-
posing forces and forbade the stationing of heavy weaponry within 
the zone. Despite the agreement, shelling and crossfire between both 
sides occurs on an almost daily basis.  
Land inside the buffer zone and on the line of contact is heavily 
contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). 
While the location of the line of contact now remains largely static, 
in 2014 and 2015 it was far more f luid with large areas of territory 
regularly changing hands during the fighting. This has resulted in 
widespread mine and UXO contamination, not just along the cur-
rent line of contact but also within and outside of the buffer zone. 
Additionally, civilians continue to live in areas where neither side 
has full control, commonly referred to as the grey zone. Here the 
threat from landmines and UXO is also prevalent.
Figure 1. Maps showing the major movements of the non-government controlled areas from May 2014 to 
March 2016 when the line of contact became more static.
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Figure 2. Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions showing HALO’s current area of op-
erations.
Ukraine is a Party to the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and in 2018 
received approval of its request to extend its 
deadline to 1 June 2021 to clear its territo-
ry of all known anti-personnel minefields. 
However, the extension request stated that 
achieving these obligations was dependent 
on “…completion of hostilities, restoration 
of the constitutional order and gaining the 
full control over the occupied territories, 
including over the state border between 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation.”1 
Currently HALO is only able to work 
in areas controlled by the government of 
Ukraine and is working across both oblasts 
inside and outside the buffer zone. HALO 
is unable to work on the line of contact or 
the grey zone but teams are working to sur-
vey and clear areas close by where the threat 
of mines and UXO is affecting the civilian 
population. Therefore the challenges out-
lined only refer to the areas within eastern 
Ukraine where HALO works. They do not re-
fer to the nature of the mine and ERW prob-
lem in areas of Ukraine where HALO is not 
working: the grey zone, the line of contact 
itself, and the NGCAs, which may differ in 
terms of threat type.
Ukraine-Specific 
Challenges
Operating in conflict-affected regions. 
While the intensity of the conflict in Ukraine 
has decreased since the heavy fighting of 2014, 
indirect fire and shooting close to the line of 
contact remains a reality. HALO does not 
work in areas where there is a threat of mines being relaid. However, 
the buffer zone contains the most areas with mine contamination, and 
this means there is a need to work in some areas that are only a few 
kilometers from the line of contact. Although civilians and NGOs are 
not deliberately targeted, working in such close proximity to the line 
of contact does present a risk to demining teams from stray indirect 
fire. Careful consideration of the security situation in those particu-
lar areas is required before demining teams deploy close to the line of 
contact. If shelling occurs nearby or there has been a major escalation 
close to the minefield, work is suspended and teams moved in order 
to guarantee the security of demining staff. HALO does not deploy 
teams in those areas where there is a high threat of indirect fire or close 
to active military positions; however, there are inevitably times when 
demining teams within the buffer zone have to suspend work and are 
moved as a safety precaution. 
Destruction of items. Humanitarian demining operators do not 
yet have access to explosives in Ukraine, nor permission to carry out 
render-safe procedures. This hinders the work but is not an insur-
mountable problem. Rather than conducting demolitions, the de-
struction or removal of ERW requires close coordination with the 
State Emergency Service (SES). When HALO finds a mine or item 
of UXO, the SES is contacted and their assistance is requested. 
Although this generally works well, the situation in Ukraine means 
that the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity of the SES is 
often over-stretched. In some cases the lead time between the dis-
covery of an item and its removal can be a number of days. In cases 
where the device poses a particular danger such as where a tripwire- 
initiated device is discovered, deminers have to be moved a safe 
distance away to work elsewhere on the minefield. Where there is a 
significant delay in a device’s destruction or removal the clearance 
strategy of the minefield can be disrupted. 
Challenges in the Minefields
Non-technical and technical survey. The nature of mine clear-
ance is that the majority of the time the mines remaining in a con-
taminated area are buried or concealed. Therefore in order to avoid 
clearing land unnecessarily non-technical and technical survey 
methods are used. Where minelaying has been conducted in a uni-
form pattern, technical survey methods can be useful. Technical 
survey involves conducting limited clearance to find exactly where 
a mine-line is, enabling the follow-up clearance of the minefield to 
be more targeted and avoiding the need to clear areas far from the 
identified pattern.
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The type of minelaying in Ukraine varies between professionally 
laid defensive belts placed in a clear uniform pattern, such as a line 
of evenly spaced anti-vehicle mines across a field, and sporadic mine-
laying. The latter being due either to low-level tactical considerations 
dictating the logic of where small numbers of mines have been placed 
or because of nuisance minelaying conducted by non-professional 
soldiers or combatants. 
The prevalence of this sporadic minelaying can often severely limit 
the usefulness of technical survey. It is difficult to find a pattern when 
there was no pattern or where the logic of the minelaying was down 
to tactical rather than geographic considerations relevant at the time. 
Even in the case of defensive minefields laid in a clear uniform 
pattern by professional military units, an operator’s ability to con-
duct technical survey can be limited if a large number of mines 
have already been removed by military forces or the local popula-
tion. These minefields still require clearance because some mines 
may have been missed. However, by removing mines from an area, 
the original pattern becomes obscured and establishing where the 
mine-line was can be difficult. This can result in larger amounts of 
clearance needing to be conducted in order to find a relatively small 
amount of mines.
Aids to non-technical survey. In cases where minelaying is spo-
radic and the benefits of technical survey are limited, good quality 
non-technical survey becomes ever more im-
portant. Where it can be difficult to establish a 
pattern or logic to the minelaying through tech-
nical survey or the early stages of clearance, in-
formation from local communities and other 
informants can often help mitigate this. A good 
understanding of the tactical situation in a par-
ticular area at the time of the minelaying can of-
ten be far more effective than trying to rely on 
traditional technical survey methods. Moreover, 
there is an archive of high-quality satellite imag-
es of Ukraine available on Google Earth. Given 
that the minelaying is relatively recent, predom-
inantly 2014-2015, these images sometimes re-
veal evidence of minelaying that is no longer 
visible on the ground. An example of this are the 
tracks from a military minelaying machine, as 
shown in Figure 3. Such imagery aids the accu-
racy of non-technical survey and can eventually 
lead to more efficient clearance. 
Clearing tripwire-initiated devices and minimum-met-
al mines. The most common devices encountered by HALO in 
Ukraine are tripwire-initiated hand grenades, anti-personnel 
bounding-fragmentation mines (OZM-72s), both metal-cased and 
minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines (TM-62 and TM-62P), and di-
rectional fragmentation mines (generally the MON series of an-
ti-group mines). There is also the threat of UXO, ranging from 
small-caliber cannon rounds to large-caliber mortar rounds. 
Furthermore, many minefields contain a combination of different 
threats. Open media sources document that anti-personnel blast 
mines such as PMN-2s and MS-3s, along with a range of improvised 
devices and booby-traps, have also been used in the conflict, but at 
the time of writing HALO has not found these types of items during 
its clearance operations in Ukraine.
The possibility of a wide variety of threat types, including trip-
wire-initiated devices, has to be considered when clearing an area. 
Of land currently surveyed by HALO and remaining to be cleared, 
75 percent has a potential tripwire threat. The remaining 25 percent 
are anti-vehicle mine-only tasks, of which 12 percent are minimum-
metal mines and 13 percent are metal-cased mines.  
Minefields that involve the clearance of tripwires, or minimum-
metal anti-vehicle mines, are slower to clear than land with metal 
Figure 3. Google Earth imagery of a surveyed minefield in Donetsk region. The 
arrow indicates three visible lines created by a military mine laying machine. 
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Figure 4. Graph showing comparative speed of clearance rates measure in the square meters cleared, per team, per month.
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anti-vehicle mines only, without the threat from tripwire devices. 
Additionally, unlike many countries with a historic legacy of mine 
contamination, most of the tripwires in Ukraine are still intact, hav-
ing only been laid within the last five years and being made of either 
metal or nylon. This means metal detectors cannot be relied upon 
alone as a means of searching for tripwires. As a result, a visual drill 
involving the use of a fiber rod to guide the eye followed by the in-
cremental removal of vegetation is required. This is intrinsically slow 
when compared with clearance methods for other threat types (as 
shown in Figure 4).  
In minefields where there is only a threat of metal anti-vehicle 
mines, deminers can conduct clearance by walking over the suspect 
ground with a large-loop metal detector with the sensitivity cali-
brated to the mine-type. Deminers then manually investigate met-
al signals. This process enables clearance rates of over 50,000 sq m 
(59,8000 sq yd) per team per month. This process is slowed, however, 
when the threat of tripwire-initiated devices is also a possibility. In 
such instances the slower tripwire search must be conducted across 
the minefield before a large-loop detector can be used to look for the 
buried anti-vehicle mines. Therefore, what would ordinarily be a rela-
tively fast method of clearance is slowed to an average rate of 5,000 sq 
m (5,980 sq yd) per team per month, by the presence or suspicion of 
tripwire-initiated devices.  
The clearance of areas where the threat of minimum metal anti- 
vehicle mines is suspected also poses challenges and is often slow com-
pared with searching for metal-cased mines. This is due to the need to 
use more sensitive detectors to locate the mines, which inevitably also 
results in more signals from small metallic clutter being picked up that 
have to be investigated through manual soil excavation to determine 
whether a threat exists. This problem is exacerbated by contamination 
from shelling thereby increasing the levels of metal clutter in the soil. 
Moreover, Ukraine’s famously fertile chernozem soil is heavily min-
eralized, further limiting the range of suitable detectors. While the chal-
lenge of searching for minimum-metal mines is not unique to Ukraine, 
in places where this threat is combined with 
a need to search for tripwire-initiated de-
vices, it results in a significantly more time- 
consuming process when compared with 
clearing other types of mines.  
New Detectors
HALO is anticipating deploying a team 
with combined ground penetrating radar 
(GPR) and metal detectors in 2019. The GPR 
detectors should enable metallic clutter to 
be distinguished from anti-vehicle mines. 
By being able to better distinguish between 
clutter and the profile of an anti-vehicle 
mine, teams can rapidly excavate clutter, 
leaving the remaining signals to be excavat-
ed as per standard procedures. This should 
increase the efficiency of clearing anti- 
vehicle minefields where there are large 
amounts of metal fragmentation from shell-
ing. Such detectors have had a significant 
Image 3 and 4: A Large Loop Detector used for clearing anti-vehicle mines (left) in contrast to a deminer conducting trip-
wire clearance (right).
Image 5. A deminer using a ‘Minelab UXO-head’ detector, searching for minimum- 
metal plastic cased anti-vehicle mines.
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make excavations incredibly slow and grueling. Enabling 
work to continue in such conditions relies on using cre-
ative methods and respecting the tough conditions the 
teams are working in. Ensuring teams are equipped with 
suitable clothing and boots and have the facilities and 
time required to warm up on the minefields is funda-
mental. In such conditions it is crucial to ensure demin-
ers are able to maintain concentration to ensure safe and 
efficient work. 
Mechanical assets. HALO Ukraine is building its me-
chanical capacity and currently the program has two 
front loaders and is looking into further mechanical op-
tions. The front loaders are currently being used to clear 
areas such as former military positions that are difficult 
and slow for manual teams. Having a mechanical ca-
pacity also enables some clearance teams to be deployed 
through the winter months. 
2019 will see the trial and deployment of lightly ar-
mored remote vegetation cutters. The objective of these 
machines is to support manual teams by cutting the 
vegetation ahead of their progress on a task. It is expected this will 
improve the efficiency of the drill by speeding up one of the most 
time-consuming parts of the process: the careful investigation and 
removal of vegetation. Depending on the success of these machines, 
a lighter equivalent will be considered with the aspiration to deploy 
them onto minefields where there is a mixed threat of devices such as 
tripwires and anti-vehicle mines. 
Melting frozen ground. During winter, fires are lit in safe areas 
within the minefields to heat up a saline solution and provide warmth 
during breaks. The saline solution is used to thaw frozen ground. 
When a metal signal has been identified and isolated, the hot liquid 
is then poured over the soil. The ground is then covered with cut veg-
etation, which acts as insulation trapping the warmth. This process 
enables the ground to thaw overnight and makes soil excavations 
possible the following day. 
impact in other HALO programs such as Afghanistan, where in some 
places it has decreased the number of manual excavations required by 
over 90 percent, it is hoped the same success will be true for Ukraine. 
Incremental Changes to Drills
Seemingly small innovations can make drastic differences to clear-
ance rates. An example of this is the quadrat method, using a 2-by-
2 m (2.19-by-2.19 yd) boxing drill where lanes are cleared using the 
standard manual trip-wire search drill to create boxes over which a 
detector can be swept but without the need to use a fiber rod to slowly 
inspect the area inside the box. The size of the box and the fact it is sur-
rounded by cleared ground negates the presence of tripwires that are 
not clearly visible and sweeping a detector over the top ensures there 
is no device without a tripwire on the surface. Innovations such as this 
have made the existing drill faster without compromising on safety. 
Challenges From 
Extreme Climate 
Over the course of a year in Ukraine the 
temperature can vary across 60 C, and these 
extremes pose additional challenges for mine 
clearance. In the summer, temperatures on 
minefields can reach 40 C (104 F), and over 
the course of the long winter the tempera-
ture can drop to -20 C (-4 F). In January and 
February, the months with the most extreme 
weather, only the mechanical clearance teams 
can work. Snow makes effective and safe trip-
wire clearance impossible, and the short days 
and freezing temperatures can often inhibit 
clearance on tripwire minefields for even lon-
ger from November to March.
The cold conditions also affect other as-
pects of clearance. Snow and frozen ground 
Figure 5. A diagram demonstrating the ‘quadrat’ method.
Image 6. A HALO Ukraine front loader conducting mechanical mine clearance 
in challenging winter conditions.
6
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss1/8
ISSUE 23.1 @ APRIL 2019 23
Looking Ahead
Beyond security and access restrictions, the primary challenges 
of conducting humanitarian mine clearance in Ukraine are from 
tripwire-initiated devices and minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines. 
HALO Ukraine is developing both technical and human methods 
to overcome the challenges posed and to increase the efficiency of 
clearing land. This involves using techniques and technology used 
elsewhere in the world but also requires the trialing of new ideas 
and innovations. Similarly, the challenges of working within the 
context of Ukraine are, where possible, also mitigated and over-
come through innovative means and where necessary through li-
aison with state bodies. 
Ultimately the importance of optimizing clearance rates and 
increasing the efficiency of HALO’s work in Ukraine is to remove 
life-threatening hazards from ERW contaminated land. The more ef-
ficiently minefields can be cleared the faster land can be returned for 
use by landowners and the community. Restoring land to its original 
state helps the lives and livelihoods of those living in affected areas 
return to normal. 
Although seeking new innovations is important, the major-
ity of the work is ultimately done by Ukrainian men and women. 
High-quality training provides the skills required to clear the land. 
Oversight and guidance from experienced demining team leaders 
and supervisors in the field ensures that safety is maintained and the 
quality and thoroughness of HALO’s clearance remains to the high-
est standards. It is therefore the quality of HALO’s personnel that is 
the most important factor. Developing their skills and building their 
experience allows HALO to deliver its lifesaving work despite the 
challenges faced within Ukraine. 
See endnotes page 69
Image 7. A deminer excavating through defrosted ground.
Image 8. Deminers warming up in sub-zero conditions, to 
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